论文标题
Zipphone：保护用户位置隐私免受蜂窝服务提供商
ZipPhone: Protecting user location privacy from cellular service providers
论文作者
论文摘要
无线服务提供商跟踪所有用户连接的时间和位置。位置推理攻击在揭示无线服务匿名用户的身份方面有效。在本文中，我们提出了Zipphone，该解决方案利用现有的蜂窝基础架构来改善用户隐私。 Spartacus允许用户社区战略性地计时他们的联系，以保持匿名，同时造成最小的公用事业损失。我们从单元格服务提供商和寻求隐私用户的社区的角度评估了Zipphone，并使用两个包含数百个用户的小区塔日志的数据集量化了Zipphone的隐私/公用事业权衡。我们介绍并评估使用位置分析和轨迹链接的脱姓词算法。我们发现，通过每十分钟续签标识符并延迟离线30秒，用户可以将其可识别性降低高达45％。
Wireless service providers track the time and location of all user connections. Location inference attacks have been effective in revealing the identity of anonymous users of wireless services. In this paper, we propose ZipPhone, a solution that leverages existing cellular infrastructure to improve user privacy. Spartacus allows a community of users to strategically time their connections to remain anonymous while incurring a minimal loss of utility. We evaluate ZipPhone from the perspective of a cell service provider and a community of privacy-seeking users, and quantify the privacy/utility trade-off of ZipPhone using two datasets containing cell tower logs of hundreds of users. We present and assess a deanonymization algorithm that uses both location profiling and trajectory linking. We find that by renewing identifiers every ten minutes and remaining offline for 30 seconds, users can reduce their identifiability by up to 45%.
