论文标题
双重策略 - 防止策略的社会选择功能的结构
The structure of two-valued strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
论文作者
论文摘要
我们为所有防止策略的社会选择功能提供了一个结构定理，其范围是一组给定较大替代方案的两个基数。 在允许选民/代理人表达冷漠的情况下，我们提供了这一点，并且领域包括对任意基数社会的偏好的概况。采用表示公式的形式的定理可用于构建所考虑的所有功能。
We give a structure theorem for all coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a given larger set of alternatives. We provide this in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to express indifference and the domain consists of profiles of preferences over a society of arbitrary cardinality. The theorem, that takes the form of a representation formula, can be used to construct all functions under consideration.
