论文标题
基于基尼指数的初始硬币提供机制
Gini Index based Initial Coin Offering Mechanism
论文作者
论文摘要
作为一种筹款方法，在过去两年中，初始硬币产品（ICO）为数千家初创企业筹集了数十亿美元。现有的ICO机制更加重视最大筹款的短期收益，同时忽略了不平衡的代币分配问题，这对随后的筹款产生了负面影响，并且对引入新的投资者和资源产生了不良影响。我们提出了一种新的ICO机制，该机制首次使用Gini索引的概念作为控制分配不平等的机制设计约束。我们的机制保持了优雅而直接的结构。它使代理商可以将其投标作为价格发现过程进行修改，同时限制鲸鱼的投标。我们在机制下分析了药物的平衡行为。在自然的技术假设下，我们表明大多数代理具有简单的主导策略，而均衡收入在代理商数量中逐渐获得最佳收入。我们使用收集的实际ICO数据集验证我们的机制，并确认我们的机制在分配公平和收入方面都表现良好。
As a fundraising method, Initial Coin Offering (ICO) has raised billions of dollars for thousands of startups in the past two years. Existing ICO mechanisms place more emphasis on the short-term benefits of maximal fundraising while ignoring the problem of unbalanced token allocation, which negatively impacts subsequent fundraising and has bad effects on introducing new investors and resources. We propose a new ICO mechanism which uses the concept of Gini index for the very first time as a mechanism design constraint to control allocation inequality. Our mechanism maintains an elegant and straightforward structure. It allows the agents to modify their bids as a price discovery process, while limiting the bids of whales. We analyze the agents' equilibrium behaviors under our mechanism. Under natural technical assumptions, we show that most agents have simple dominant strategies and the equilibrium revenue approaches the optimal revenue asymptotically in the number of agents. We verify our mechanism using real ICO dataset we collected, and confirm that our mechanism performs well in terms of both allocation fairness and revenue.
