论文标题
用于安全CPS实施的监视和检测系统的正式合成
Formal Synthesis of Monitoring and Detection Systems for Secure CPS Implementations
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑在存在损坏网络对植物和控制器之间的数据交换的中间攻击的情况下，确保给定的网络物理系统（CPS）确保给定的控制循环实现的问题。为此，存在各种检测方案，可为理论控制模型提供数学保证。但是，此类保证可能不适合实际的控制软件实施。在本文中，我们提出了一种正式的方法，用于合成具有不同阈值的攻击探测器，这可以防止性能降低隐秘攻击，同时最大程度地减少错误警报。
We consider the problem of securing a given control loop implementation of a cyber-physical system (CPS) in the presence of Man-in-the-Middle attacks on data exchange between plant and controller over a compromised network. To this end, there exist various detection schemes that provide mathematical guarantees against such attacks for the theoretical control model. However, such guarantees may not hold for the actual control software implementation. In this article, we propose a formal approach towards synthesizing attack detectors with varying thresholds which can prevent performance degrading stealthy attacks while minimizing false alarms.
