论文标题
让您的朋友关闭：与朋友的土地分配
Keeping Your Friends Close: Land Allocation with Friends
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了将土地地块分配给喜欢生活在朋友旁边的潜在买家的问题。他们不仅在乎他们收到的情节，还关心邻居。这种外部性导致高度不平凡的问题结构，因为友谊和土地价值在确定剂的行为中起着作用。我们研究了保证土地价值和友谊的真实报道的机制。我们提出了可以提供真实性和福利保证的随机串行独裁统治（RSD）的变体。有趣的是，我们的社会福利保证是通过友谊的价值参数来参数：如果这些价值观低，实现真实的行为会导致福利保证，并对代理人的选择施加了重大限制；如果它们很高，我们就可以达到最佳社会福利的近似值。
We examine the problem of assigning plots of land to prospective buyers who prefer living next to their friends. They care not only about the plot they receive, but also about their neighbors. This externality results in a highly non-trivial problem structure, as both friendship and land value play a role in determining agent behavior. We examine mechanisms that guarantee truthful reporting of both land values and friendships. We propose variants of random serial dictatorship (RSD) that can offer both truthfulness and welfare guarantees. Interestingly, our social welfare guarantees are parameterized by the value of friendship: if these values are low, enforcing truthful behavior results in poor welfare guarantees and imposes significant constraints on agents' choices; if they are high, we achieve good approximation to the optimal social welfare.
