论文标题
使用块模型对社交困境中决策和模型选择的最佳预测
Optimal prediction of decisions and model selection in social dilemmas using block models
论文作者
论文摘要
促进我们对人类行为的理解取决于理论揭示这种行为基础机制的能力。衡量理论和模型预测未观察到的行为的能力提供了一种原则性的方法来评估其优点，从而帮助确定哪些机制最合理。在这里，我们提出模型并开发严格的推理方法，以预测二元社会困境中的战略决策。特别是，我们使用二分随机块模型，结合了个人面临的困境的信息。我们表明，将这些模型与有关二元社会困境中战略决策的经验数据相结合，尽管不是“理性”，但在很大程度上可以预见的是个体的战略决策。对这些模型的分析还使我们得出结论：（i）个人不会根据游戏理论结构感知游戏； （ii）个人使用多种简单策略的组合做出决策，我们的方法自然而然地揭示了这些策略。
Advancing our understanding of human behavior hinges on the ability of theories to unveil the mechanisms underlying such behaviors. Measuring the ability of theories and models to predict unobserved behaviors provides a principled method to evaluate their merit and, thus, to help establish which mechanisms are most plausible. Here, we propose models and develop rigorous inference approaches to predict strategic decisions in dyadic social dilemmas. In particular, we use bipartite stochastic block models that incorporate information about the dilemmas faced by individuals. We show, combining these models with empirical data on strategic decisions in dyadic social dilemmas, that individual strategic decisions are to a large extent predictable, despite not being "rational." The analysis of these models also allows us to conclude that: (i) individuals do not perceive games according their game-theoretical structure; (ii) individuals make decisions using combinations of multiple simple strategies, which our approach reveals naturally.
