论文标题
电力市场中的进入和退出游戏：平均场地游戏方法
The entry and exit game in the electricity markets: a mean-field game approach
论文作者
论文摘要
我们基于最佳停止的平均场景游戏开发了电力市场行业动态的模型。在我们的模型中，有两种类型的代理：可再生生产商和传统生产者。可再生生产商选择了建造新的可再生工厂的最佳时刻，而传统生产商则选择退出市场的最佳时刻。代理商通过市场价格进行互动，通过与具有外在需求功能的两种生产商的总供应相匹配。使用最佳停止平均场游戏的轻松表述，我们证明了NASH平衡的存在和均衡价格过程的独特性。提出了一个受英国电力市场启发的经验例子。该示例表明，虽然可再生补贴显然会导致更高的可再生能源渗透率，但这可能需要在较高的峰值价格上向消费者带来成本。为了避免价格上涨，必须将可再生补贴与机制结合起来，以确保在高峰期达到足够的常规能力来满足能源需求。
We develop a model for the industry dynamics in the electricity market, based on mean-field games of optimal stopping. In our model, there are two types of agents: the renewable producers and the conventional producers. The renewable producers choose the optimal moment to build new renewable plants, and the conventional producers choose the optimal moment to exit the market. The agents interact through the market price, determined by matching the aggregate supply of the two types of producers with an exogenous demand function. Using a relaxed formulation of optimal stopping mean-field games, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium and the uniqueness of the equilibrium price process. An empirical example, inspired by the UK electricity market is presented. The example shows that while renewable subsidies clearly lead to higher renewable penetration, this may entail a cost to the consumer in terms of higher peakload prices. In order to avoid rising prices, the renewable subsidies must be combined with mechanisms ensuring that sufficient conventional capacity remains in place to meet the energy demand during peak periods.
