论文标题
通过RF辐射跟踪对量子系统的攻击
An attack to quantum systems through RF radiation tracking
论文作者
论文摘要
解释了通常在量子密钥分布中使用的单个光子探测器的物理性质的新发现的安全性漏洞，我们发现，通过利用超级电池电气磁性信号从Hi-voltage Avalanche射击射出的单个光子检测器的高电压电磁信号，可以从遥远的地方拦截量子密钥传输系统的位内容物。这意味着实际上，在单个光子检测器内使用的任何Geiger模式雪崩光电二极管系统地起作用，就像将光波长光子转换为无线电波长光子，可以被天线作为侧向通道攻击。我们的实验表明，天线捕获的辐射波形可以用作指纹。作为训练数据，这些指纹被馈送到深度学习的神经网络中，并且在训练后，神经网络能够克隆量子传输的位含量。
A newfound security breach in the physical nature of single photon detectors that are generally used in quantum key distribution is explained, we found that the bit contents of a quantum key transmission system can be intercepted from far away by exploiting the ultrawideband electromagnetic signals radiated from hi-voltage avalanche effect of single photon detectors. It means that in fact any Geiger mode avalanche photodiode that is used inside single photon detectors systematically acts like a downconverter that converts the optical-wavelength photons to radio-wavelength photons that can be intercepted by an antenna as side channel attack. Our experiment showed that the radiated waveforms captured by the antenna can be used as a fingerprint. These finger prints were fed to a deep learning neural network as training data, and after training the neural network was able to clone the bit content of quantum transmission.
