论文标题
均衡客户和社会最佳的balking策略在恒定的再审查队列中，有多个假期和$ n $ policy
Equilibrium customer and socially optimal balking strategies in a constant retrial queue with multiple vacations and $N$-policy
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，研究了持续重审的均衡策略和客户的最佳拒绝策略，并分别研究了两个信息水平的$ n $ policy。我们假设服务器前面没有等待区，并且如果服务器空闲，则立即提供到达客户。否则（服务器要么忙或度假）必须离开系统以根据FCFS规则加入虚拟的重试轨道等待重试。服务完成后，如果系统不为空，则服务器会闲置，可用于为下一个客户提供服务，或者是从虚拟重试轨道上的新来客户或重试的客户；否则（如果系统为空），则服务器开始度假。度假结束后，仅当服务器在虚拟轨道中至少找到$ n $客户时才重新激活；否则，服务器将继续另一个假期。我们分别以两个信息级别研究此模型。对于每个信息级别，我们获得客户的平衡和最佳balking策略，并进行相应的数值比较。通过粒子群优化（PSO）算法，我们探讨了参数对平衡和社会最佳阈值的影响，并为最佳的社会福利而获得变化的变化趋势，这为社会计划者提供了指导意义。最后，通过比较两个信息级别的社会福利，我们发现是否应向客户披露该系统信息取决于如何维持社会福利的增长。
In this paper, equilibrium strategies and optimal balking strategies of customers in a constant retrial queue with multiple vacations and the $N$-policy under two information levels, respectively, are investigated. We assume that there is no waiting area in front of the server and an arriving customer is served immediately if the server is idle; otherwise (the server is either busy or on a vacation) it has to leave the system to join a virtual retrial orbit waiting for retrials according to the FCFS rules. After a service completion, if the system is not empty, the server becomes idle, available for serving the next customer, either a new arrival or a retried customer from the virtual retrial orbit; otherwise (if the system is empty), the server starts a vacation. Upon the completion of a vacation, the server is reactivated only if it finds at least $N$ customers in the virtual orbit; otherwise, the server continues another vacation. We study this model at two levels of information, respectively. For each level of information, we obtain both equilibrium and optimal balking strategies of customers, and make corresponding numerical comparisons. Through Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm, we explore the impact of parameters on the equilibrium and social optimal thresholds, and obtain the trend in changes, as a function of system parameters, for the optimal social welfare, which provides guiding significance for social planners. Finally, by comparing the social welfare under two information levels, we find that whether the system information should be disclosed to customers depends on how to maintain the growth of social welfare.
