论文标题
顺序筹款和相互保险
Sequential Fundraising and Mutual Insurance
论文作者
论文摘要
经常通过依次接触潜在的贡献者来进行企业的种子筹款，这些贡献者做出可观察的决定。当达成目标数量投资时，筹款活动就成功了。尽管类似于经典信息级联模型，但其行为却大不相同，表现出令人惊讶的复杂性。假设有贡献者的信息水平的共同分布，我们表明参与者依靠{\ em共同保险}，即，尽管信息不利，也可以投资，从而信任未来的玩家策略来保护他们免受损失。 {\ em委托}发生无条件投资时，就会出现对未来参与者的决定。通常，所有早期贡献者的代表实际上都赋予了最后几个贡献者决定结果的能力。在顺序投票中，类似的动态也像委员会的投票一样。
Seed fundraising for ventures often takes place by sequentially approaching potential contributors, who make observable decisions. The fundraising succeeds when a target number of investments is reached. Though resembling classic information cascades models, its behavior is radically different, exhibiting surprising complexities. Assuming a common distribution for contributors' levels of information, we show that participants rely on {\em mutual insurance}, i.e., invest despite unfavorable information, trusting future player strategies to protect them from loss. {\em Delegation} occurs when contributors invest unconditionally, empowering the decision to future players. Often, all early contributors delegate, in effect empowering the last few contributors to decide the outcome. Similar dynamics hold in sequential voting, as in voting in committees.
