论文标题
投票：可扩展的强制投票系统
VoteAgain: A scalable coercion-resistant voting system
论文作者
论文摘要
投票系统的最强大威胁模型考虑了强制抵抗：对迫使选民修改投票或弃权的胁迫者的保护。现有的远程投票系统要么不提供此属性；需要昂贵的统计阶段；或负担用户需要存储加密关键材料并有责任欺骗其胁迫者。我们提出了投票计划，这是一种可扩展的投票计划，依靠词汇范式提供胁迫抵抗。投票使用一种新颖的确定性投票填充机制来确保胁迫者无法看到是否已更换了投票。这种机制可确保统计需要准时间时间，这使得投票成为第一个可以处理数百万选民选举的审视计划。我们证明，投票提供投票隐私，胁迫抵抗和可验证性；我们使用所有加密原始图的原型实现来证明其可扩展性。
The strongest threat model for voting systems considers coercion resistance: protection against coercers that force voters to modify their votes, or to abstain. Existing remote voting systems either do not provide this property; require an expensive tallying phase; or burden users with the need to store cryptographic key material and with the responsibility to deceive their coercers. We propose VoteAgain, a scalable voting scheme that relies on the revoting paradigm to provide coercion resistance. VoteAgain uses a novel deterministic ballot padding mechanism to ensure that coercers cannot see whether a vote has been replaced. This mechanism ensures tallies take quasilinear time, making VoteAgain the first revoting scheme that can handle elections with millions of voters. We prove that VoteAgain provides ballot privacy, coercion resistance, and verifiability; and we demonstrate its scalability using a prototype implementation of all cryptographic primitives.
