论文标题
与非本地资源的古典贝叶斯游戏中的前态与事后平衡
Ex ante versus ex post equilibria in classical Bayesian games with a nonlocal resource
论文作者
论文摘要
我们分析了在非本地（量子或无信号）资源的协助下进行的古典游戏中的Ex ante和Ex后平衡之间的差异。在物理学中，这些游戏的玩法被称为执行二手铃铛型实验。通过分析Clauser-Horn Shimony-Holt游戏，我们找到了一个建设性的程序，可以找到具有非本地的两人贝叶斯游戏（即无信号，并且在许多情况下，在许多情况下）优势。从文献中知道的大多数这种游戏都可以按照这一原则构建，并分享其相关的事前平衡也是均衡之后的属性。我们基于Vértesiand Bene的Bell Theorem介绍了一种新型的游戏，该游戏没有后者的属性：Ex ante and ex tost equilibria不同。
We analyze the difference between ex ante and ex post equilibria in classical games played with the assistance of a nonlocal (quantum or no-signaling) resource. In physics, the playing of these games is known as performing bipartite Bell-type experiments. By analyzing the Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt game, we find a constructive procedure to find two-person Bayesian games with a nonlocal (i.e. no-signaling, and, in many cases, quantum) advantage. Most games of this kind known from the literature can be constructed along this principle, and share the property that their relevant ex ante equilibria are ex post equilibria as well. We introduce a new type of game, based on the Bell-theorem by Vértesi and Bene, which does not have the latter property: the ex ante and ex post equilibria differ.
