论文标题
关于合作的观察
Observations on Cooperation
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了代理商随机匹配以扮演囚犯困境的环境，每个玩家都观察到伴侣过去对以前的对手的一些行动。我们通过允许一小部分人的承诺类型来偏离现有的文献。坚定的代理商的存在破坏了先前提出的维持合作的机制。我们提出了一种新型的直观组合，可以在各种环境中维持合作。此外，我们表明，在平稳性的额外假设下，这种策略的组合本质上是支持完全合作的独特机制，并且对各种扰动都是可靠的。最后，我们将结果扩展到一个设置，在该设置中，代理商还可以观察到过去对手对当前合作伙伴的行动，并且我们表明哪种观察结构对于维持合作是最佳的。
We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a small fraction of the population to be commitment types. The presence of committed agents destabilizes previously proposed mechanisms for sustaining cooperation. We present a novel intuitive combination of strategies that sustains cooperation in various environments. Moreover, we show that under an additional assumption of stationarity, this combination of strategies is essentially the unique mechanism to support full cooperation, and it is robust to various perturbations. Finally, we extend the results to a setup in which agents also observe actions played by past opponents against the current partner, and we characterize which observation structure is optimal for sustaining cooperation.
