论文标题
消费者软件的收入最大化：订阅或永久许可？
Revenue Maximization for Consumer Software: Subscription or Perpetual License?
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了出版商出售消费者软件的收入最大化问题。我们假设出版商出售传统的永久许可，订阅许可或两者兼而有之。为了进行分析，我们采用了游戏理论模型，这使我们能够得出用户的均衡策略和发布者的最佳定价策略。通过广泛的数值评估，我们证明了不同的定价策略对出版商的收入产生的相当大的影响，并为最重要的环境参数提供了比较静态。尽管实际上，许多出版商仍然只出售感知许可，但我们发现，除了永久许可外，提供订阅许可证通常（但并非总是如此）会导致收入明显高于仅仅出售任何一种类型的许可证。
We study the revenue maximization problem of a publisher selling consumer software. We assume that the publisher sells either traditional perpetual licenses, subscription licenses, or both. For our analysis, we employ a game-theoretic model, which enables us to derive the users' equilibrium strategies and the publisher's optimal pricing strategy. Via extensive numerical evaluations, we then demonstrate the sizable impact different pricing strategies have on the publisher's revenue, and we provide comparative statics for the most important settings parameters. Although in practice, many publishers still only sell perceptual licenses, we find that offering a subscription license in addition to a perpetual license typically (but not always) leads to significantly higher revenue than only selling either type of license on its own.
