论文标题
重复游戏中的平衡行为
Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games
论文作者
论文摘要
当患者玩家可以在一系列近视对手面前建立声誉时，我们会检查他的行为。具有积极的概率，患者玩家是一种承诺类型，在每个时期都会扮演自己的Stackelberg行动。我们表征了患者玩家在平衡中的动作频率。我们的结果阐明了声誉可以完善患者玩家的行为的程度，并为进入威慑，商业交易和资本税提供新的见解。我们的证明通过建立新的集中不平等来做出方法论贡献。
We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the patient player's action frequencies in equilibrium. Our results clarify the extent to which reputations can refine the patient player's behavior and provide new insights to entry deterrence, business transactions, and capital taxation. Our proof makes a methodological contribution by establishing a new concentration inequality.
