论文标题
传感器欺骗攻击在网络物理系统的监督层的合成
Synthesis of Sensor Deception Attacks at the Supervisory Layer of Cyber-Physical Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
我们在监督控制层的背景下研究网络物理系统（CPS）的安全性。具体而言，我们在离散事件系统的框架中提出了CPS攻击者的一般模型，并研究了为给定反馈控制系统综合攻击策略的问题。我们的模型捕获了一类欺骗攻击，攻击者有能力劫持传感器读数的子集并误导主管，目的是将系统诱导到不良状态。我们利用一种类似游戏的离散过渡结构，称为插入攻击结构（IDA）来捕获主管与环境之间的相互作用（包括系统和攻击者）。我们展示了如何使用IDA综合三种不同类型的成功隐身攻击，即避免从主管发现并造成系统损害的攻击。
We study the security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in the context of the supervisory control layer. Specifically, we propose a general model of a CPS attacker in the framework of discrete event systems and investigate the problem of synthesizing an attack strategy for a given feedback control system. Our model captures a class of deception attacks, where the attacker has the ability to hijack a subset of sensor readings and mislead the supervisor, with the goal of inducing the system into an undesirable state. We utilize a game-like discrete transition structure, called Insertion-Deletion Attack structure (IDA), to capture the interaction between the supervisor and the environment (which includes the system and the attacker). We show how to use IDAs to synthesize three different types of successful stealthy attacks, i.e., attacks that avoid detection from the supervisor and cause damage to the system.
