论文标题
从直觉主义到通过Kripke模型的多元价值逻辑
From Intuitionism to Many-Valued Logics through Kripke Models
论文作者
论文摘要
直觉的命题逻辑被证明是KurtGödel（1932）的无限重视逻辑，而StanisławJaśkowski（1936）证明了它是许多有价值的逻辑。在本文中，我们使用Saul Kripke（1959）的模型为这些定理提供了替代证明。戈德尔的证明引起了中间的命题逻辑（直觉和古典之间），如今已被称为戈德尔或戈德尔 - 戴默德逻辑，并且也由模糊逻辑学家研究。我们还提供了有关此逻辑中命题连接词的可确定性的一些结果。
Intuitionistic Propositional Logic is proved to be an infinitely many valued logic by Kurt Gödel (1932), and it is proved by Stanisław Jaśkowski (1936) to be a countably many valued logic. In this paper, we provide alternative proofs for these theorems by using models of Saul Kripke (1959). Gödel's proof gave rise to an intermediate propositional logic (between intuitionistic and classical), that is known nowadays as Gödel or the Gödel-Dummet Logic, and is studied by fuzzy logicians as well. We also provide some results on the inter-definablility of propositional connectives in this logic.
