论文标题
解决自动驾驶决策中的冲突
Resolving Conflict in Decision-Making for Autonomous Driving
论文作者
论文摘要
关于自动驾驶的决策和计划的最新工作利用了游戏理论方法来建模代理之间的相互作用。我们证明，基于Stackelberg的游戏公式的方法容易受到我们称为冲突的问题。我们的结果表明，当发生冲突时，它会引起亚最佳和潜在的危险行为。作为回应，我们开发了一个理论框架，用于分析冲突影响此类方法的程度，并将此框架应用于对代理之间建模相互作用的几种现有方法。此外，我们提出了增强的利他主义，这是一种建模Stackelberg游戏中玩家之间相互作用的新方法，并表明它比以前的技术不易冲突。最后，我们通过与人类参与者进行实验来研究基础我们方法的行为假设。结果表明，我们的模型比现有的互动驾驶理论模型更好地解释了人类决策。
Recent work on decision making and planning for autonomous driving has made use of game theoretic methods to model interaction between agents. We demonstrate that methods based on the Stackelberg game formulation of this problem are susceptible to an issue that we refer to as conflict. Our results show that when conflict occurs, it causes sub-optimal and potentially dangerous behaviour. In response, we develop a theoretical framework for analysing the extent to which such methods are impacted by conflict, and apply this framework to several existing approaches modelling interaction between agents. Moreover, we propose Augmented Altruism, a novel approach to modelling interaction between players in a Stackelberg game, and show that it is less prone to conflict than previous techniques. Finally, we investigate the behavioural assumptions that underpin our approach by performing experiments with human participants. The results show that our model explains human decision-making better than existing game-theoretic models of interactive driving.
