论文标题
很好的电话隐私
Pretty Good Phone Privacy
论文作者
论文摘要
为了在当今的蜂窝架构中获得服务，电话独特地将自己识别为塔楼，从而向操作员识别。现在，这是违反严重隐私权的原因，因为运营商现在出售和泄漏了数亿移动用户的身份以及位置数据。 在本文中，我们对蜂窝架构进行端到端的视角，并找到解耦的关键点，使我们能够保护用户身份和位置隐私，而不会更改物理基础架构，没有增加的延迟，也没有对现有运营商进行直接合作的要求。 我们描述了相当好的电话隐私（PGPP），并演示了我们修改后的后端堆栈（NGC）如何与真实的电话一起使用，以提供普通但具有隐私性的连接性。我们在模拟大型大都市地区的模拟中探索了固有的隐私和效率权衡。我们展示了PGPP如何维护当今的控制开销，同时显着改善了用户身份和位置隐私。
To receive service in today's cellular architecture, phones uniquely identify themselves to towers and thus to operators. This is now a cause of major privacy violations, as operators now sell and leak identity and location data of hundreds of millions of mobile users. In this paper, we take an end-to-end perspective on the cellular architecture and find key points of decoupling that enable us to protect user identity and location privacy with no changes to physical infrastructure, no added latency, and no requirement of direct cooperation from existing operators. We describe Pretty Good Phone Privacy (PGPP) and demonstrate how our modified backend stack (NGC) works with real phones to provide ordinary yet privacy-preserving connectivity. We explore inherent privacy and efficiency tradeoffs in a simulation of a large metropolitan region. We show how PGPP maintains today's control overheads while significantly improving user identity and location privacy.
