论文标题
零知识游戏
Zero Knowledge Games
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们对游戏进行建模，以使所有策略都不透视，并具有不完美的召回和不完整的信息。我们还引入了修改后的滑块代码作为线性转换，该线性转换产生了有关播放器在公开公告下的知情方式的共同知识。最终，我们看到两个球员或两个联盟之间。零知识的游戏，两位玩家都被告知具有混合策略NASH平衡中建立的信任实用性。零知识游戏是信任和健全的游戏之一，使实用程序被告知。对于任何可能不知情的球员，这样的玩家都表明自己是不知情的。可能会侵蚀“验证意志”，以使索赔人永远不会对他们反复的虚假索赔或不知情负责。
In this paper we model a game such that all strategies are non-revealing, with imperfect recall and incomplete information. We also introduce a modified sliding-block code as a linear transformation which generates common knowledge of how informed a player is under public announcements. Ultimately, we see that between two players or two coalitions; zero-knowledge games where both players are informed have the utility of trust established in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. A zero-knowledge game is one of trust and soundness, placing utility in being informed. For any player who may be uninformed, such players reveal they are uninformed. The "will to verify" may be eroded such that the claimant is never held responsible for their repeated false claims or being uninformed.
