论文标题
增强的能源管理系统，包括实时重新分配威胁分析工具和网络物理SCED
An Enhanced Energy Management System Including a Real-Time Load-Redistribution Threat Analysis Tool and Cyber-Physical SCED
论文作者
论文摘要
即使在具有保护方案的系统中，也可以对电源系统发动不可检测的负载重新分配（LR）攻击。因此，必须在电力系统中检测LR攻击并制定纠正措施提供安全的操作点。在本文中，我们开发了系统的实时LR威胁分析（RTLRTA）工具，该工具可以标记LR攻击并确定所有受影响的传输资产。由于攻击者可能会使用随机偏差来创建LR攻击，因此我们引入了一个优化模型来生成随机LR攻击。因此，我们可以确定检测索引的准确阈值，并在发生随机LR攻击时测试工具的功能。此外，根据攻击后阶段的实际载荷的估计，我们设计了一组物理线流量安全约束（PLFSCS），并将其添加到安全受限的经济调度（SCED）模型中。我们称新的模型网络物理SCED（CPSCED）可以适当响应已确定的LR攻击并提供安全的调度点。我们在$ 2383 $ -BUS的测试系统中为不同的目标线生成多种情况，以验证我们所提出的方法在检测LR攻击并响应它们时的精度和功能。
It is possible to launch undetectable load-redistribution (LR) attacks against power systems, even in systems with protection schemes. Therefore, detecting LR attacks in power systems and establishing a corrective action to provide secured operating points are imperative. In this paper, we develop a systematic real-time LR threat analysis (RTLRTA) tool, which can flag LR attacks and identify all affected transmission assets. Since attackers might use random deviations to create LR attacks, we introduce an optimization model to generate random LR attacks. Hence, we can determine accurate thresholds for our detection index and test the tool's functionality when there are random LR attacks. Additionally, based on an estimation for the actual loads in the post-attack stage, we design a set of physical line flow security constraints (PLFSCs) and add it to the security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) model. We call the new model cyber-physical SCED (CPSCED), which can appropriately respond to the identified LR attacks and provide secured dispatch points. We generate multiple scenarios of random LR attacks and noise errors for different target lines in the $2383$-bus Polish test system to validate our proposed methods' accuracy and functionality in detecting LR attacks and responding to them.
