论文标题
关于小组通信计划的安全
On the Security of Group Communication Schemes
论文作者
论文摘要
安全的组通信是一种机制，促进了从发送者到多个接收器的消息传输的受保护传输，并且有线和无线网络中的许多新兴应用都需要支持这种机制。有线网络中有许多安全的组通信方案，可以直接采用或适当地适应移动临时网络（MANETS）和传感器网络等无线网络。在本文中，我们表明我们已经检查的流行群体交流方案容易受到以下攻击的攻击：妥协的外部对手可能会获得{\ em all}过去和现在的群体密钥（因此所有受其保护的信息）；这与广泛接受的信念形成鲜明对比，即这样的对手只能获取当前的群体密钥（从而得到由其保护的信息）。为了理解和处理攻击，我们为状态和无状态的团体通信方案进行了正式的两个安全模型。我们表明，某些实用方法可以使现有的组通信方案的{\ em子类}对攻击免疫。
Secure group communications are a mechanism facilitating protected transmission of messages from a sender to multiple receivers, and many emerging applications in both wired and wireless networks need the support of such a mechanism. There have been many secure group communication schemes in wired networks, which can be directly adopted in, or appropriately adapted to, wireless networks such as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and sensor networks. In this paper we show that the popular group communication schemes that we have examined are vulnerable to the following attack: An outside adversary who compromises a certain legitimate group member could obtain {\em all} past and present group keys (and thus all the messages protected by them); this is in sharp contrast to the widely-accepted belief that a such adversary can only obtain the present group key (and thus the messages protected by it). In order to understand and deal with the attack, we formalize two security models for stateful and stateless group communication schemes. We show that some practical methods can make a {\em subclass} of existing group communication schemes immune to the attack.
