论文标题
拍卖年金
Auctioning Annuities
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出并估计年金需求和供应模型。为此，我们使用了来自智利的丰富数据，那里的年金通过两阶段的过程在私人市场中买卖：首价拍卖，然后进行谈判。我们对公司建模有关遗产和企业风险评级不同的成本和退休人员的私人信息和退休人员。我们发现了巨大的成本和偏好异质性，并且由于有很多公司，市场的运作良好。反事实表明，通过英语拍卖来简化当前机制，并“关闭”风险评级会增加养老金，但仅适用于大型养老机。
We propose and estimate a model of demand and supply of annuities. To this end, we use rich data from Chile, where annuities are bought and sold in a private market via a two-stage process: first-price auctions followed by bargaining. We model firms with private information about costs and retirees with different mortalities and preferences for bequests and firms' risk ratings. We find substantial costs and preference heterogeneity, and because there are many firms, the market performs well. Counterfactuals show that simplifying the current mechanism with English auctions and "shutting down" risk ratings increase pensions, but only for high-savers.
