论文标题
政策制定者在预定的前瞻性目标的预定工具中的信誉
Policy Maker's Credibility with Predetermined Instruments for Forward-Looking Targets
论文作者
论文摘要
本文的目的是为中央银行提供如何在关心许多政策目标（例如产出差距和预期通货膨胀等政策目标）时如何在不同的货币政策规则中进行选择的标准。特别注意政策工具是预先确定的还是仅向前看的。使用New-Keyneian Phillips曲线，具有成本震动的政策传播机制，前瞻性案例意味着极度缺乏稳健性和稳定政策的信誉。向后看的情况是，在有限的承诺下，简单规则参数可以成为Ramsey最佳策略的解决方案。结果，我们建议通过拉姆西最佳政策明确对政策制定者的理性行为进行建模，而不是使用模棱两可的假设使用简单的规则，从而导致既不强大也不可信的政策建议。
The aim of the present paper is to provide criteria for a central bank of how to choose among different monetary-policy rules when caring about a number of policy targets such as the output gap and expected inflation. Special attention is given to the question if policy instruments are predetermined or only forward looking. Using the new-Keynesian Phillips curve with a cost-push-shock policy-transmission mechanism, the forward-looking case implies an extreme lack of robustness and of credibility of stabilization policy. The backward-looking case is such that the simple-rule parameters can be the solution of Ramsey optimal policy under limited commitment. As a consequence, we suggest to model explicitly the rational behavior of the policy maker with Ramsey optimal policy, rather than to use simple rules with an ambiguous assumption leading to policy advice that is neither robust nor credible.
