论文标题
在重复游戏中，Tit-for-Tat策略是一种变形的零确定策略
Tit-for-Tat Strategy as a Deformed Zero-Determinant Strategy in Repeated Games
论文作者
论文摘要
我们介绍了重复游戏中变形零确定策略的概念。然后，我们证明，重复囚犯的困境游戏中的tit-for-tat策略是一种变形的零确定策略，它单方面均衡了两个玩家的回报的概率分配功能。
We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the probability distribution functions of payoffs of two players.
