论文标题
道德和其他备受推动者的游戏理论模型
Game-theoretic Models of Moral and Other-Regarding Agents
论文作者
论文摘要
我们在有限的正常形式游戏中调查了康德的均衡游戏，这是一类非北山，道德动机的行动方案，最近在经济学文献中提出。我们重点介绍了这种均衡的许多问题，包括计算棘手性，高度协调的价格以及对一般正常形式游戏的昂贵/有问题的扩展。我们指出，这种适当的概括可能涉及程序均衡的概念。最后，我们提出了一些与康德统一相关的一般，直观，可计算的，可触犯的，其他的均衡，以及在纯粹的自我尊敬和康德行为之间插值的一类行动方案。
We investigate Kantian equilibria in finite normal form games, a class of non-Nashian, morally motivated courses of action that was recently proposed in the economics literature. We highlight a number of problems with such equilibria, including computational intractability, a high price of miscoordination, and expensive/problematic extension to general normal form games. We point out that such a proper generalization will likely involve the concept of program equilibrium. Finally we propose some general, intuitive, computationally tractable, other-regarding equilibria related to Kantian equilibria, as well as a class of courses of action that interpolates between purely self-regarding and Kantian behavior.
