论文标题
隐藏的议程:一种具有多元化的均衡的社交推论游戏
Hidden Agenda: a Social Deduction Game with Diverse Learned Equilibria
论文作者
论文摘要
多种合作研究的主要挑战是,单个代理人不仅需要有效合作,而且需要与谁合作。当其他代理人隐藏,可能不一致的动机和目标时,这在情况下尤其重要。社会扣除游戏提供了一种研究个人如何学会综合有关他人潜在不可靠信息并阐明其真正动机的途径。在这项工作中,我们提出了隐藏的议程,这是一款两支球队的社交扣除游戏,它为在未知团队一致性方案中学习学习代理提供了2D环境。环境承认了两支球队的丰富策略。在隐藏议程中接受培训的强化学习者表明,特工可以学习各种行为,包括合作和投票,而无需以自然语言进行交流。
A key challenge in the study of multiagent cooperation is the need for individual agents not only to cooperate effectively, but to decide with whom to cooperate. This is particularly critical in situations when other agents have hidden, possibly misaligned motivations and goals. Social deduction games offer an avenue to study how individuals might learn to synthesize potentially unreliable information about others, and elucidate their true motivations. In this work, we present Hidden Agenda, a two-team social deduction game that provides a 2D environment for studying learning agents in scenarios of unknown team alignment. The environment admits a rich set of strategies for both teams. Reinforcement learning agents trained in Hidden Agenda show that agents can learn a variety of behaviors, including partnering and voting without need for communication in natural language.