论文标题
Stablesims：通过基于代理的建模优化Makerdao清算2.0激励措施
StableSims: Optimizing MakerDAO Liquidations 2.0 Incentives via Agent-Based Modeling
论文作者
论文摘要
StableSims项目着手确定新拍卖机制的最佳参数，即Makerdao使用的Leilectation 2.0，该协议是基于以太坊建立的，该协议提供了一个分散的，取代的，称为DAI的副词。我们开发了一个基于代理的模拟，该模拟既模仿制造商协议智能合同逻辑，又要在面临清算“金库”（抵押债务位置）和竞标诸如附加拍卖之类的决定时在现实世界中采取的利润动机（“饲养者”）将如何在现实世界中发挥作用。这项研究的重点是清算2.0中引入的激励结构，该结构同时实现了恒定费用（提示）和与支付的保管库尺寸（芯片）成正比的费用，这些支付者支付给了清算金库或重新启动陈旧抵押品拍卖的饲养员。我们试图最大程度地减少激励措施所支付的金额，同时最大程度地提高底层库库的速度。我们的发现表明，增加恒定费用而不是比例费用更具成本效益，以减少饲养员清算保管库所需的时间。
The StableSims project set out to determine optimal parameters for the new auction mechanism, Liquidations 2.0, used by MakerDAO, a protocol built on Ethereum offering a decentralized, collateralized stablecoin called Dai. We developed an agent-based simulation that emulates both the Maker protocol smart contract logic, and how profit-motivated agents ("keepers") will act in the real world when faced with decisions such as liquidating "vaults" (collateralized debt positions) and bidding on collateral auctions. This research focuses on the incentive structure introduced in Liquidations 2.0, which implements both a constant fee (tip) and a fee proportional to vault size (chip) paid to keepers that liquidate vaults or restart stale collateral auctions. We sought to minimize the amount paid in incentives while maximizing the speed with which undercollateralized vaults were liquidated. Our findings indicate that it is more cost-effective to increase the constant fee, as opposed to the proportional fee, in order to decrease the time it takes for keepers to liquidate vaults.
