论文标题
脉冲星的物理公开可验证的随机性
Physical Publicly Verifiable Randomness from Pulsars
论文作者
论文摘要
我们演示了如何将无线电脉冲星用作随机数发生器。具体而言,我们专注于公开可验证的随机性(PVR),其中多方获得了相同的可信赖和可验证的随机数。 PVR是许多过程和算法(包括密码学,科学试验,选举审计和国际条约)的关键基础。但是,当前的方法(基于数字理论)可能很快就会变得容易受到量子计算机的影响,从而激发了基于自然物理现象的对PVR的不断增长。在这种情况下,我们探索脉冲星作为潜在的物理PVR来源。我们首先表明,从明亮的毫秒脉冲星的测得的通量密度中提取的位序列可以通过标准化的测试以进行随机性。然后,我们使用澳大利亚与Parkes望远镜进行的第二个PULSAR和中国五百架孔径球形射频望远镜(FAST)同时观察了从Pulsar通量密度序列中摘除的三种说明性方法。我们证明,在两个观测值下确实可以获得相同的位序列,但是在确定两个独立序列之间的预期位错误率时,辐射计噪声的无处不在。我们在虚构的用例的背景下讨论了我们的结果,在一个虚构的用例的背景下,两个相互不信任的政党希望获得相同的随机位序列,从而探索潜在的方法来减轻恶意参与者。
We demonstrate how radio pulsars can be used as random number generators. Specifically, we focus on publicly verifiable randomness (PVR), in which the same sequence of trusted and verifiable random numbers is obtained by multiple parties. PVR is a critical building block for many processes and algorithms (including cryptography, scientific trials, electoral audits and international treaties). However, current approaches (based on number theory) may soon become vulnerable to quantum computers, motivating a growing demand for PVR based on natural physical phenomena. In this context, we explore pulsars as a potential physical PVR source. We first show that bit sequences extracted from the measured flux densities of a bright millisecond pulsar can pass standardised tests for randomness. We then quantify three illustrative methods of bit-extraction from pulsar flux density sequences, using simultaneous observations of a second pulsar carried out with the Parkes telescope in Australia and the Five-hundred-metre Aperture Spherical radio Telescope (FAST) in China, supported by numerical simulations. We demonstrate that the same bit sequence can indeed be obtained at both observatories, but the ubiquitous presence of radiometer noise needs to be accounted for when determining the expected bit error rate between two independent sequences. We discuss our results in the context of an imaginary use-case in which two mutually distrusting parties wish to obtain the same random bit sequence, exploring potential methods to mitigate against a malicious participant.