论文标题
用于纹身的山雀：合作，沟通以及如何稳定对方
Tit for Tattling: Cooperation, communication, and how each could stabilize the other
论文作者
论文摘要
间接互惠是一种机制，个人与与他人合作的人合作。这创建了一个制度，其中不需要重复的互动即可激发合作（正如直接互惠所必需的）。但是，间接互惠会造成一个新问题：代理商如何知道谁与他人合作？要知道这一点，代理商需要访问某种形式的声誉信息。也许有一个传播声誉信息的通信系统，但是它如何保持真实和信息性？大多数论文都假定存在一个真实，即将到来的信息沟通系统。在本文中，我们试图解释在没有外在压力的情况下，这种通信系统如何在进化上保持稳定。具体而言，我们提出三个条件，共同维持沟通系统的真实性和合作的普遍性：个人（1）使用一种奖励其规定的行为的规范（一个统一的规范），（2）不仅可以信号对其他代理人的行为表示信号，而且还可以表明其真实性（通过介绍其范围的第三个派对范围），使得众所周知有误解的方式，并偶然地互动，并且（3）和（3），（3），（3），（3） 多样性。
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism by which individuals cooperate with those who have cooperated with others. This creates a regime in which repeated interactions are not necessary to incent cooperation (as would be required for direct reciprocity). However, indirect reciprocity creates a new problem: how do agents know who has cooperated with others? To know this, agents would need to access some form of reputation information. Perhaps there is a communication system to disseminate reputation information, but how does it remain truthful and informative? Most papers assume the existence of a truthful, forthcoming, and informative communication system; in this paper, we seek to explain how such a communication system could remain evolutionarily stable in the absence of exogenous pressures. Specifically, we present three conditions that together maintain both the truthfulness of the communication system and the prevalence of cooperation: individuals (1) use a norm that rewards the behaviors that it prescribes (an aligned norm), (2) can signal not only about the actions of other agents, but also about their truthfulness (by acting as third party observers to an interaction), and (3) make occasional mistakes, demonstrating how error can create stability by introducing diversity.
