论文标题
当地多数与恩非金规则可以解释网络协调游戏中的全球共识动态
Local majority-with-inertia rule can explain global consensus dynamics in a network coordination game
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究小组如何通过改变通信网络结构和个人激励措施来达成共识。在342个由七个人组成的网络中，单一的自以为是的“领导者”可以推动决策结果，但不会加速共识的形成，而冲突的意见却缓慢共识。尽管具有更多链接的网络达到共识的速度更快，但这种优势在冲突下消失了。未经公开的人做出选择与当地多数规则相一致的选择，加上“惯性”，而“惯性”赞成他们以前的选择，而自以为是的人则赞成他们的首选选择，但在高同伴或时间压力下产生。模拟显示这些单独的规则可以说明小组模式，并在防止僵局的同时允许快速共识。
We study how groups reach consensus by varying communication network structure and individual incentives. In 342 networks of seven individuals, single opinionated "leaders" can drive decision outcomes, but do not accelerate consensus formation, whereas conflicting opinions slow consensus. While networks with more links reach consensus faster, this advantage disappears under conflict. Unopinionated individuals make choices consistent with a local majority rule combined with "inertia" favouring their previous choice, while opinionated individuals favour their preferred option but yield under high peer or time pressure. Simulations show these individual rules can account for group patterns, and allow rapid consensus while preventing deadlocks.
