论文标题
离散交换经济体中的稳定分配
Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究以不可分割的商品的交换经济分配。这个问题众所周知，这是具有挑战性的，足够丰富，可以编码从根本上不稳定的经济体，例如室友问题。我们的方法源于对具有单位需求和单位捐赠的交换经济的原始研究，即\ emph {住房模型}。我们的第一种方法使用围巾的定理，并提出了足够的条件，在该条件下，``凸出然后''技术可确保核心是非空的。结果是，核心分配存在于具有二分偏见的分类经济体中。我们的第二种方法使用TTC的概括：它在一般条件下起作用，并找到一个解决方案，该解决方案是稳定集的版本。
We study stable allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods. The problem is well-known to be challenging, and rich enough to encode fundamentally unstable economies, such as the roommate problem. Our approach stems from generalizing the original study of an exchange economy with unit demand and unit endowments, the \emph{housing model}. Our first approach uses Scarf's theorem, and proposes sufficient conditions under which a ``convexify then round'' technique ensures that the core is nonempty. The upshot is that a core allocation exists in categorical economies with dichotomous preferences. Our second approach uses a generalization of the TTC: it works under general conditions, and finds a solution that is a version of the stable set.
