论文标题
医院融资的说明：地方融资与中央融资
A note on hospital financing: local financing vs. central financing
论文作者
论文摘要
本说明试图研究医院的行为在医院间协作或竞争中如何受到医院融资系统的影响。为此，本说明模拟了两个场景，这些方案从以下基线场景开始：一个状态，一组医院，每个医院都有基本层面的所有类型的病房。这种基线情景的演变在于医院的发展，也就是说，医院可能使他们的一些病房脱颖而出。国家有一个预算，用于该基线情况的发展，可以通过两个融资系统使用：要么通过“本地融资”（即，通过将预算分配到医院之间，以便每家医院都在管理自己的一部分预算中，通过追求“中心融资”的预算来管理自己的一部分预算，而不是通过企业的收益来管理预算，即，在临终关怀中，该预算是由临终关怀的，因此，这是一个益处。 社区。结论似乎是：在当地的融资系统中，医院倾向于多样化其卓越，而在中央融资系统中，国家倾向于创造出卓越的杆。
This note tries to study how hospital behaviors, with reference to interhospital collaboration or competition, could be affected by hospital financing systems. For that this note simulates two scenarios which start with the following baseline scenario: a State, with a set of hospitals, each with all types of wards at a basic level. The evolution of this baseline scenario consists in the evolution of hospitals, that is, in the possibility of hospitals to make some of their wards excel. The State has a budget, for the evolution of this baseline scenario, which can be used by two financing systems: either by a "local financing", i.e., by splitting the budget among the hospitals so that each hospital is managing its own portion of the budget by pursuing the individual benefit, or by a "central financing", i.e., by not splitting the budget among the hospitals so that the State is the sole manager of the budget, by pursuing the benefit of the whole community. The conclusions seem to be that: in the local financing system hospitals tend to diversify their excellences, while in the central financing system the State tends to create poles of excellence.
