论文标题
腐败，机构惩罚和经济因素之间相互联系的影响
Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors for the evolution of cooperation
论文作者
论文摘要
对利他的惩罚在支持人类和其他物种之间的公共合作中起着重要作用的观点已被公众广泛接受。但是，如果考虑腐败，利他惩罚在增强合作中的积极作用将受到破坏。最近，行为实验已经证实了这一发现，并进一步研究了领导者的惩罚能力和经济潜力的影响。然而，相对较少的研究重点是这些因素如何从理论角度影响合作的演变。在这里，我们将机构惩罚公共物品游戏与贿赂游戏结合起来，以研究上述因素对合作发展的影响。理论和数值结果表明，当合作者更倾向于提供贿赂时，腐败的存在将降低合作水平。此外，我们证明，更强大的领导者和更丰富的经济潜力对于增强合作都很重要。特别是，当叛逃者更倾向于贿赂时，如果经济潜力较弱，更强大的领导者可以维持合作社的公共物品的贡献。
The view that altruistic punishment plays an important role in supporting public cooperation among human beings and other species has been widely accepted by the public. However, the positive role of altruistic punishment in enhancing cooperation will be undermined if corruption is considered. Recently, behavioral experiments have confirmed this finding and further investigated the effects of the leader's punitive power and the economic potential. Nevertheless, there are relatively few studies focusing on how these factors affect the evolution of cooperation from a theoretical perspective. Here, we combine institutional punishment public goods games with bribery games to investigate the effects of the above factors on the evolution of cooperation. Theoretical and numerical results reveal that the existence of corruption will reduce the level of cooperation when cooperators are more inclined to provide bribes. In addition, we demonstrate that stronger leader and richer economic potential are both important to enhance cooperation. In particular, when defectors are more inclined to provide bribes, stronger leaders can sustain the contributions of public goods from cooperators if the economic potential is weak.
