论文标题
RPKILLER：从RPKI依靠方观点的威胁分析
Rpkiller: Threat Analysis from an RPKI Relying Party Perspective
论文作者
论文摘要
资源公共密钥基础架构（RPKI）旨在通过创建基础架构来确保互联网路由，其中资源持有人可以在其中证明其资源。 RPKI证书机构发表这些证明，并将其发布在出版物上。依靠派对软件从所有出版物中检索并处理与RPKI相关的数据，验证数据并使其可用于路由器，以便他们可以做出安全的路由决策。在这项工作中，我们为依靠党软件创建了一个威胁模型，攻击者控制证书授权和出版物。我们实施了一个原型测试台，以分析当前依赖方软件的实现如何对来自该威胁模型的场景做出反应。我们的结果表明，所有当前的依赖方软件都容易受到至少一种已确定的威胁。除此之外，我们还确定了根据协议本身做出的选择引起的威胁。综上所述，这些威胁可能会使攻击者能够在全球范围内完全破坏所有依靠政党软件的RPKI。我们向实施者进行了协调的漏洞披露，并使我们的测试床软件可用于将来的研究。
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) aims to secure internet routing by creating an infrastructure where resource holders can make attestations about their resources. RPKI Certificate Authorities issue these attestations and publish them at Publication Points. Relying Party software retrieves and processes the RPKI-related data from all publication points, validates the data and makes it available to routers so they can make secure routing decisions. In this work, we create a threat model for Relying Party software, where an attacker controls a Certificate Authority and Publication Point. We implement a prototype testbed to analyse how current Relying Party software implementations react to scenarios originating from that threat model. Our results show that all current Relying Party software was susceptible to at least one of the identified threats. In addition to this, we also identified threats stemming from choices made in the protocol itself. Taken together, these threats potentially allow an attacker to fully disrupt all RPKI Relying Party software on a global scale. We performed a Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure to the implementers and have made our testbed software available for future studies.
