论文标题
最佳违约，有限执行和合同规定
Optimal Defaults, Limited Enforcement and the Regulation of Contracts
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究政府如何通过合同环境的设计来促进社会福利。我们将合同的法规模拟为默认代表团：政府选择了愿意执行的合同术语集合，并影响当事方谈判中用作外部选择的默认条款。我们的分析表明，限制代表团集主要减轻外部性，而默认术语主要实现分配目标。将我们的模型应用于劳动合同的监管，我们将对最佳默认委托政策进行比较静态。随着股权关注或外部性的增加，对工人的实物支持会增加（例如，通过福利要求和公共卫生保险）。同时，当工人议价能力从平等中降低时，对工人的支持增加了现金（例如，通过现金转移和最低工资法）。
We study how governments promote social welfare through the design of contracting environments. We model the regulation of contracting as default delegation: the government chooses a delegation set of contract terms it is willing to enforce, and influences the default terms that serve as outside options in parties' negotiations. Our analysis shows that limiting the delegation set principally mitigates externalities, while default terms primarily achieve distributional objectives. Applying our model to the regulation of labor contracts, we derive comparative statics on the optimal default delegation policy. As equity concerns or externalities increase, in-kind support for workers increases (e.g. through benefits requirements and public health insurance). Meanwhile, when worker bargaining power decreases away from parity, support for workers increases in cash (e.g. through cash transfers and minimum wage laws).
