论文标题
高福利匹配市场通过下降价格
High Welfare Matching Markets via Descending Price
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑设计双面匹配的货币机制。递延接受算法传统的机制，即使在融入金钱的变体中，也倾向于集中于稳定的标准。相反，在这项工作中，我们寻求一种以社会福利保证的简单拍卖启发的机制。我们考虑了Wagoner和Weyl（2019）提出的（但未分析）的降价机制，称为Marshallian Match。当潜在匹配的所有值均为积极时，我们以“回扣”的付款规则显示了马歇利亚的比赛，就会达到无政府状态的恒定价格。该结果扩展到模型，并具有获取有关一个人值的信息以及在超图上匹配的成本。具有可能的估值，可以捕获例如就业市场，问题变得更加困难。我们介绍了近似稳定性的概念，并表明它们具有有益的福利含义。但是，证明恒定因素福利的主要问题保证了“前稳定平衡”中的保证仍然是开放的。
We consider design of monetary mechanisms for two-sided matching. Mechanisms in the tradition of the deferred acceptance algorithm, even in variants incorporating money, tend to focus on the criterion of stability. Instead, in this work we seek a simple auction-inspired mechanism with social welfare guarantees. We consider a descending-price mechanism called the Marshallian Match, proposed (but not analyzed) by Waggoner and Weyl (2019). When all values for potential matches are positive, we show the Marshallian Match with a "rebate" payment rule achieves constant price of anarchy. This result extends to models with costs for acquiring information about one's values, and also to matching on hypergraphs. With possibly-negative valuations, which capture e.g. job markets, the problem becomes harder. We introduce notions of approximate stability and show that they have beneficial welfare implications. However, the main problem of proving constant factor welfare guarantees in "ex ante stable equilibrium" remains open.
