论文标题
论证理论中犹豫不决的形式和规范
Forms and Norms of Indecision in Argumentation Theory
论文作者
论文摘要
论证理论的主要目标是评估论点并确定是否应接受或拒绝论证。如果没有明确的答案，则必须考虑第三个未定的选择。犹豫不决通常不是明确的，而是被视为所有不清楚或令人不安的案件的集合。但是，当前的哲学是将犹豫不决本身作为适当考虑的对象的重要意义。本文旨在揭示有关哲学犹豫不决的发现与论证理论中犹豫不决的待遇之间的相似之处。通过调查论证理论涉及哪些哲学形式和犹豫不决的形式和规范，我们可以提高对论证理论中不同不确定的证据情况的理解。
One main goal of argumentation theory is to evaluate arguments and to determine whether they should be accepted or rejected. When there is no clear answer, a third option, being undecided, has to be taken into account. Indecision is often not considered explicitly, but rather taken to be a collection of all unclear or troubling cases. However, current philosophy makes a strong point for taking indecision itself to be a proper object of consideration. This paper aims at revealing parallels between the findings concerning indecision in philosophy and the treatment of indecision in argumentation theory. By investigating what philosophical forms and norms of indecision are involved in argumentation theory, we can improve our understanding of the different uncertain evidential situations in argumentation theory.
