论文标题
组合多轮上升拍卖
The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction
论文作者
论文摘要
组合多轮上升拍卖（CMRA）是一种新的拍卖格式，已经在最近的几个欧洲频谱拍卖中使用。我们表征了前柱均衡，这些平衡具有特定于拍卖的形式的真实竞标，需求扩展和需求减少，因为竞标者的边缘值降低或不稳定。特别是，我们表明，真相的平衡在竞标者帽中脆弱。另一方面，如果投标人足够对称，则CMRA容易受到无风险勾结的影响。我们提出了一项替代活动规则，该规则可以防止这种犯罪策略，但保持另一个均衡状态。我们讨论了我们的理论在多大程度上与丹麦频谱拍卖的结果一致，以及如何使用招标数据测试我们的预测。
The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction (CMRA) is a new auction format that has already been used in several recent European spectrum auctions. We characterize ex-post equilibria that feature auction-specific forms of truthful bidding, demand expansion, and demand reduction for settings where bidders have either decreasing or non-decreasing marginal values. In particular, we show that the truthtelling equilibrium is fragile to small asymmetries in the bidders' caps. On the other hand, if bidders are sufficiently symmetric, the CMRA is vulnerable to risk-free collusion. We propose an alternative activity rule that prevents such collusive strategies but keeps the other equilibria intact. We discuss to what extent our theory is consistent with outcomes in Danish spectrum auctions and how our predictions can be tested using bidding data.
