论文标题
科学需要主体间性吗？量子力学的正统解释中的确认问题
Does Science need Intersubjectivity? The Problem of Confirmation in Orthodox Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics
论文作者
论文摘要
对量子力学的任何成功解释都必须解释我们的经验证据如何使我们了解量子力学。在本文中，我们认为“正统解释”类别不符合这种重要标准，其中包括QBISM，NEO-POPENHAGEN解释以及某些版本的关系量子力学。我们证明，主体间性在这些方法中以根本性的方式失败，并且我们解释了为什么主体间的经验确认至关重要。我们详细介绍了信仰更新可能在正统解释所假定的宇宙中起作用的方式，并认为这样一个宇宙中的观察者无法逃脱自己的观点，以了解应该根据这些解释来构成现实的观点的结构。我们还认为，在这些解释的某些版本中，甚至不可能将自己的相对频率用于经验确认。最终，我们得出的结论是，相信这类解释是不合理的，除非它们补充了某些与观察者无关的结构，这些结构至少在至少某些情况下承诺了主体间协议。
Any successful interpretation of quantum mechanics must explain how our empirical evidence allows us to come to know about quantum mechanics. In this article, we argue that this vital criterion is not met by the class of 'orthodox interpretations,' which includes QBism, neo-Copenhagen interpretations, and some versions of relational quantum mechanics. We demonstrate that intersubjectivity fails in radical ways in these approaches, and we explain why intersubjectivity matters for empirical confirmation. We take a detailed look at the way in which belief-updating might work in the kind of universe postulated by an orthodox interpretation, and argue that observers in such a universe are unable to escape their own perspective in order to learn about the structure of the set of perspectives that is supposed to make up reality according to these interpretations. We also argue that in some versions of these interpretations it is not even possible to use one's own relative frequencies for empirical confirmation. Ultimately we conclude that it cannot be rational to believe these sorts of interpretations unless they are supplemented with some observer-independent structure which underwrites intersubjective agreement in at least certain sorts of cases.
