论文标题
具有不可忽略疾病死亡率的流行病人口游戏
Epidemic Population Games With Nonnegligible Disease Death Rate
论文作者
论文摘要
将标准化流行病隔室模型和人口游戏结合起来的最新文章提出了一种系统理论方法，以捕捉人口战略行为与流行病的过程之间的耦合。它引入了一种回报机制，该机制通过激励措施来控制人口的战略选择，从而导致传染病中流行最低的受到成本限制。在假设疾病死亡率大约为零的假设下，它使用Lyapunov功能来证明并制定一个准征符程序，以计算人口传染分数的峰值大小的上限。在本文中，我们将这些结果推广到疾病死亡率不可忽略的情况下。这种概括带来了归一化隔室模型中的其他耦合项，从而导致更复杂的Lyapunov功能和回报机制。此外，不能再确切确定相关的上限，但是可以通过求解一组凸程序来以任意精度计算。
A recent article that combines normalized epidemic compartmental models and population games put forth a system theoretic approach to capture the coupling between a population's strategic behavior and the course of an epidemic. It introduced a payoff mechanism that governs the population's strategic choices via incentives, leading to the lowest endemic proportion of infectious individuals subject to cost constraints. Under the assumption that the disease death rate is approximately zero, it uses a Lyapunov function to prove convergence and formulate a quasi-convex program to compute an upper bound for the peak size of the population's infectious fraction. In this article, we generalize these results to the case in which the disease death rate is nonnegligible. This generalization brings on additional coupling terms in the normalized compartmental model, leading to a more intricate Lyapunov function and payoff mechanism. Moreover, the associated upper bound can no longer be determined exactly, but it can be computed with arbitrary accuracy by solving a set of convex programs.
