论文标题
在学校选择中防止策略的成本
The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
论文作者
论文摘要
我们将最突出的策略和稳定算法的结果（递延接受，DA）以及最突出的策略和帕累托最佳算法（TOP Trading Cycles，TTC，TTC）的结果与级别最小化机制（RM）产生的分配。尽管人们希望从排名效率方面对DA和TTC的RM提高，但改进的规模仍然令人惊讶。此外，虽然它不是明确设计的，但RM也显着改善了最糟糕的学生的位置。此外，RM比TTC产生的嫉妒较差。我们使用在布达佩斯入学的数据来证实我们的发现。
We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top Trading Cycles, TTC) to the allocation generated by the rank-minimizing mechanism (RM). While one would expect that RM improves upon both DA and TTC in terms of rank efficiency, the size of the improvement is nonetheless surprising. Moreover, while it is not explicitly designed to do so, RM also significantly improves the placement of the worst-off student. Furthermore, RM generates less justified envy than TTC. We corroborate our findings using data on school admissions in Budapest.
