论文标题
组织犯罪：西西里黑手党的实证分析
Organizing Crime: an Empirical Analysis of the Sicilian Mafia
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们通过社交网络分析和链接形成的计量经济学分析研究了西西里黑手党成员的组织结构。我们的电源结果如下。 i）黑手党网络是一个小世界网络，该网络根据其犯罪性质进行了调整，并且具有强烈的分解。 ii）黑手党老板并不总是在网络中核心。特别是，与Baccara和Bar-ISAAC的预测一致，我们在网络中确定了一个“以细胞为主导的层次结构”：关键成员不是中心，而是与具有中心位置的亲戚相关的。 iii）如果两个代理人属于同一曼丹托，则两个代理之间的链接形成的可能性更高，如果它们共享大量相似的任务，而作为“ boss”，则降低了它们之间的链接形成的可能性。 iv）如果他负责将联系在曼德曼多之外，收取保护资金或或具有指令角色，而年龄则具有适度的角色，则个人代理人的链接形成可能性更高。这些结果是根据黑手党及其已知的层次结构所面临的效率/安全权衡来解释的。
In this article we study the organizational structure of a large group of members of the Sicilian Mafia by means of social network analysis and an econometric analysis of link formation. Our mains results are the following. i) The Mafia network is a small-world network adjusted by its criminal nature, and is strongly disassortative. ii) Mafia bosses are not always central in the network. In particular, consistent with a prediction of Baccara and Bar-Isaac, we identify a "cell-dominated hierarchy" in the network: a key member is not central, but is connected to a relative with a central position. iii) The probability of link formation between two agents is higher if the two agents belong to the same Mandamento, if they share a high number of similar tasks, while being a "boss" reduces the probability of link formation between them. iv) The probability of link formation for an individual agent is higher if he is in charge of keeping connections outside his Mandamento, of collecting protection money and or having a directive role, while age has modest role. These results are interpreted in the light of the efficiency/security trade-off faced by the Mafia and of its known hierarchical structure.
