论文标题
信息稳定的最佳拍卖
Information-Robust Optimal Auctions
论文作者
论文摘要
一个好的单位出售给两个竞标者之一。每个投标人的先验估值高或较低的商品估值。他们先前的估值是独立和相同分布的。每个投标人都可以观察到有关其先前估值的独立且分布相同的信号。卖方知道先前估值概况的分布，并且知道信号是独立和相同分布的，但不知道信号分布。此外，卖方知道投标人会发挥不主导的策略。我发现，具有随机储备的第二价格拍卖可以最大程度地提高所有可能的信号分布的最差预期收入，而在不占主导的策略中，所有平衡的收入最大。
A single unit of a good is sold to one of two bidders. Each bidder has either a high prior valuation or a low prior valuation for the good. Their prior valuations are independently and identically distributed. Each bidder may observe an independently and identically distributed signal about her prior valuation. The seller knows the distribution of the prior valuation profile and knows that signals are independently and identically distributed, but does not know the signal distribution. In addition, the seller knows that bidders play undominated strategies. I find that a second-price auction with a random reserve maximizes the worst-case expected revenue over all possible signal distributions and all equilibria in undominated strategies.
