论文标题
多进食混合AC-DC系统中紧急频率控制的激励机制设计
Incentive Mechanism Design for Emergency Frequency Control in Multi-Infeed Hybrid AC-DC System
论文作者
论文摘要
在多进食混合AC-DC（MIDC）系统中，参与LCC-HVDC系统的应急频率控制（EFC）对于系统频率稳定性至关重要。然而，当区域电力系统由不同的决策者运营时，由于成本和损失，LCC-HVDC系统及其连接的交流系统可能不愿意参加EFC。在本文中，为了激励LCC-HVDC系统及其连接的相邻AC系统参与基于下垂的EFC，提出了一种新型的基于控制参数的激励机制，可以处理各种可能的紧急频率故障。然后，制定了基于非合作的激励游戏模型，以在MIDC系统中实现激励机制。设计了一种寻求NASH平衡的算法，并证明了NASH平衡的独特性。此外，分析和证明了所提出机制的个人合理性，激励兼容性和社会最优性。通过案例研究验证了提出的激励机制的有效性。
In multi-infeed hybrid AC-DC (MIDC) systems, the emergency frequency control (EFC) with LCC-HVDC systems participating is of vital importance for system frequency stability. Nevertheless, when regional power systems are operated by different decision-makers, the LCC-HVDC systems and their connected AC systems might be unwilling to participate in the EFC due to the costs and losses. In this paper, to incentivize the LCC-HVDC systems and their connected adjacent AC systems to participate in the droop-based EFC, a novel control-parameter-based incentive mechanism is proposed, which can deal with various possible emergency frequency faults. Then, a non-cooperative-based incentive game model is formulated to implement the incentive mechanism in the MIDC system. An algorithm for seeking the Nash equilibrium is designed, and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium is proven. Moreover, the individual rationality, incentive compatibility and social optimality of the proposed mechanism are analyzed and proven. The effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism is verified through a case study.
