论文标题
参与动力学和多学习者再培训的新兴专业化
Emergent specialization from participation dynamics and multi-learner retraining
论文作者
论文摘要
许多在线服务都是数据驱动的:用户的行为会影响系统的参数,并且系统参数会影响用户的服务体验,这反过来影响用户与系统交互的方式。例如,人们可能会选择仅用于已经运行良好的任务,或者他们可以选择切换到其他服务。这些适应性影响系统学习用户和任务的能力,以广泛提高其性能。在这项工作中,我们分析了一系列这种动态 - 用户在服务中分配参与以降低他们所经历的个人风险,并更新其模型参数以降低服务对当前用户群体的风险。我们将这些动力学称为\ emph {风险降低},涵盖了一类广泛的通用模型更新,包括梯度下降和乘法权重。对于这种一般的动力学类别,我们表明始终将渐近稳定的平衡分割,并分配给单个学习者。在轻度的假设下,功利主义的社会最佳是稳定的平衡。与以前的工作相反,这表明重复的风险最小化可能会导致(Hashimoto等,2018; Miller等,2021),我们发现,多个学习者的重复近视更新会带来更好的结果。我们通过从真实数据初始化的模拟示例来说明现象。
Numerous online services are data-driven: the behavior of users affects the system's parameters, and the system's parameters affect the users' experience of the service, which in turn affects the way users may interact with the system. For example, people may choose to use a service only for tasks that already works well, or they may choose to switch to a different service. These adaptations influence the ability of a system to learn about a population of users and tasks in order to improve its performance broadly. In this work, we analyze a class of such dynamics -- where users allocate their participation amongst services to reduce the individual risk they experience, and services update their model parameters to reduce the service's risk on their current user population. We refer to these dynamics as \emph{risk-reducing}, which cover a broad class of common model updates including gradient descent and multiplicative weights. For this general class of dynamics, we show that asymptotically stable equilibria are always segmented, with sub-populations allocated to a single learner. Under mild assumptions, the utilitarian social optimum is a stable equilibrium. In contrast to previous work, which shows that repeated risk minimization can result in (Hashimoto et al., 2018; Miller et al., 2021), we find that repeated myopic updates with multiple learners lead to better outcomes. We illustrate the phenomena via a simulated example initialized from real data.