论文标题
RISC-V幽灵攻击的软件缓解
Software Mitigation of RISC-V Spectre Attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
投机性攻击仍然是当今的积极威胁，即使最初集中在X86平台上，也可以跨越所有现代硬件体系结构。 RISC-V是一种新提出的开放指导集架构，近年来已经从行业和学术界吸引了人们的关注。在本文中，我们专注于启用猜测的RISC-V内核，如我们所示，幽灵攻击与x86一样有效。尽管过去提出了RISC-V硬件缓解，但它们尚未通过原型阶段。取而代之的是，我们为Spectre-BTI提出了低离心的软件缓解，据我们所知，X86体系结构和Spectre-RSB的灵感启发，据我们所知。我们表明这些缓解措施在实践中起作用，并且可以将它们集成到LLVM工具链中。为了透明性和可重复性，我们所有的程序和数据均可在线公开提供。
Speculative attacks are still an active threat today that, even if initially focused on the x86 platform, reach across all modern hardware architectures. RISC-V is a newly proposed open instruction set architecture that has seen traction from both the industry and academia in recent years. In this paper we focus on the RISC-V cores where speculation is enabled and, as we show, where Spectre attacks are as effective as on x86. Even though RISC-V hardware mitigations were proposed in the past, they have not yet passed the prototype phase. Instead, we propose low-overhead software mitigations for Spectre-BTI, inspired from those used on the x86 architecture, and for Spectre-RSB, to our knowledge the first such mitigation to be proposed. We show that these mitigations work in practice and that they can be integrated in the LLVM toolchain. For transparency and reproducibility, all our programs and data are made publicly available online.
