论文标题
财富介导的热力学策略进化中的社区形成
Community Formation in Wealth-Mediated Thermodynamic Strategy Evolution
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了一个由一维晶格上的重复游戏定义的动态系统，在该游戏中，玩家会跟踪他们在银行中随着时间的推移的总收益。策略更新受玻尔兹曼分布的约束，该分布取决于与每个策略相关的邻里库值，相对于定义随机波动的温度量表。因此，具有较高银行价值的玩家比银行价值较低的参与者更少改变策略。对于一个参数化的岩纸仪游戏，我们得出了一个条件，在该条件下，给定策略的社区具有固定或漂移边界的形式。我们显示了温度升高对基础系统的影响，并通过数值模拟确定了该模型的令人惊讶的特性。
We study a dynamical system defined by a repeated game on a 1D lattice, in which the players keep track of their gross payoffs over time in a bank. Strategy updates are governed by a Boltzmann distribution which depends on the neighborhood bank values associated with each strategy, relative to a temperature scale which defines the random fluctuations. Players with higher bank values are thus less likely to change strategy than players with lower bank value. For a parameterized rock-paper-scissors game, we derive a condition under which communities of a given strategy form with either fixed or drifting boundaries. We show the effect of temperature increase on the underlying system, and identify surprising properties of this model through numerical simulations.
