论文标题
超出5G身份验证和关键协议协议
A Beyond-5G Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol
论文作者
论文摘要
5G网络（5G aka）的标准化身份验证和关键协议协议具有多个安全性和隐私漏洞。在本文中，我们提出了一种新颖的身份验证和5G及其以后的关键协议协议，与标准化的5G aka兼容。我们的协议具有几个隐私和安全性，例如，完美的前进保密性，抵抗可连接性攻击以及对恶意SNS的保护。此外，使用关键封装机制（KEM）处理用户身份保护和完美的前向保密，这使我们的协议适应了量子安全设置。为了分析提出的协议的性能，我们使用后Quantum Kem Crystals-kyber，最近被选为NIST标准化，NIST后4轮4次候选KEMS。通信和计算成本的结果表明，使用我们的协议在实践中是可行的，有时比5G aka中使用的公钥加密术，即ecies。我们通过利用牺牲品进一步证明了协议的安全性。
The standardized Authentication and Key Agreement protocol for 5G networks (5G AKA) have several security and privacy vulnerabilities. In this paper, we propose a novel authentication and key agreement protocol for 5G and beyond that is compatible with the standardized 5G AKA. Our protocol has several privacy and security properties, e.g., perfect forward secrecy, resistance against linkability attacks, and protection against malicious SNs. Moreover, both the user identity protection and the perfect forward secrecy are handled using Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM), which makes our protocol adaptable to the quantum-safe setting. To analyze the performance of the proposed protocol, we use the post-quantum KEM CRYSTALS-Kyber, recently chosen to be standardized by NIST, and NIST post-quantum Round 4 candidate KEMs. The results for communication and computation costs show that utilizing our protocol is feasible in practice and sometimes outperforms the public-key cryptography used in 5G AKA, i.e., ECIES. We further prove the security of our protocol by utilizing ProVerif.
