论文标题
与错误的代理商稳定匹配
Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents
论文作者
论文摘要
由越来越多的证据表明代理在战略上简单的环境中犯错误的证据，我们提出了一个解决方案概念 - 强大的平衡 - 仅需要渐近最佳的行为。我们使用它来研究由申请人延期递延接受（DA）经营的大型随机匹配市场。尽管说实话是一个主要的策略，但几乎所有申请人在稳健的平衡方面都可能没有实质性。但是，结果必须任意接近稳定的匹配。我们的结果表明，人们可以假设真实的代理商在理论上或反事实上研究DA结果。但是，为了估算错误的代理人的偏好，应该假设稳定的匹配，但不要说实话。
Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching markets operated by the applicant-proposing Deferred Acceptance (DA). Although truth-telling is a dominant strategy, almost all applicants may be non-truthful in robust equilibrium; however, the outcome must be arbitrarily close to the stable matching. Our results imply that one can assume truthful agents to study DA outcomes, theoretically or counterfactually. However, to estimate the preferences of mistaken agents, one should assume stable matching but not truth-telling.
